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Group Affiliation and the Performance of Initial Public Offerings in the Indian Stock 
Market  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
We document the effects of group affiliation on the initial performance of the 2,713 Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) made in India under three different regulatory regimes during the period 1990-
2004. We distinguish between two competing hypotheses regarding the effect of group affiliation 
on a firm’s initial  performance in the stock market: the certification hypothesis according to which 
group  membership  is  a  positive  signal  of  firm  quality,  and  the  “tunneling”  hypothesis,  
under  which group membership affords more opportunities for the controlling shareholders to  
misappropriate the firm’s resources, and is thus, a negative signal of firm quality.  Our  results  
show  that  the  average  underpricing  of  group  companies  is  higher  than  that  of  stand-alone 
companies. In particular, the underpricing is high for companies affiliated to private foreign and 
private Indian groups. The evidence in support of the certification hypothesis is reinforced when 
we test the ex post performance of all IPOs: we find that, over time, group-affiliated companies 
have a higher probability of survival and success than their stand-alone counterparts. Groups 
appear to support their affiliates to maintain their reputation in the eyes of investors.  However, the 
long-term stock market performance of firms in all categories is negative or insignificantly 
different from zero.  Further, the long-term performance of group companies is somewhat worse 
than their stand-alone counterparts. We conclude that the higher underpricing of IPOs of group-
affiliated companies is due to investor overreaction, and may be the result of strategic behavior on 
the part of the groups to eliminate competition from lower quality issues.    
 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G32.  
Key Words: Initial Public Offering (IPO), underpricing, Indian business groups, certification, 
tunneling.   
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1 Introduction 
 
The decision to go public through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) is one of the 
most critical decisions in the life cycle of a firm. Due to its presumed importance, it has 
become one of the most widely researched topics in the finance literature.  The research 
evidence, so far, suggests a clear tradeoff between costs and benefits in the IPO decision, 
both in terms of timing and the issue price. The main considerations in the decision to 
make an IPO, that have been highlighted by researchers, include the direct underwriting 
and related transaction costs (see Ritter (1987), as well as indirect effects such as agency 
costs (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)), and the costs of evaluation by outsiders (see 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999)). The benefits from an IPO include increased liquidity 
(see Hölmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Pham, Petko and Stein (2003)), diversification 
benefits, visibility benefits and dilution of ownership structure (see Zingales (1995) and 
Pham, Petko and Stein (2003)).  There is a vast literature on this topic that examines the 
evidence in particular markets, and, in relation to specific causal variables.4  
To alleviate the costs associated with the IPO decision, firms often build their 
reputation by obtaining different types of quality certifications to signal their true quality to 
the market.  Some popular certification devices include employing a reputed auditor (see 
Beatty, 1989), associating with a venture capitalist with an established track record (see 
Barry, Muscarella, Peavey and Vetsuypens (1990)), hiring a well-known underwriter (see 
Carter, Dark and Singh (1997)), attracting strong institutional affiliation (see Hamao, 
Packer and Ritter (2000)), and recruiting a qualified management team (see Chemmanur 
and Paeglis (2004)).  The general argument in this literature is that firms try to reduce the 
investors’ uncertainty regarding their value at the time of the IPO by resorting to various 
types of reputation-enhancing exercises.  Analyzing the effect of certification on the firm’s 
initial market performance helps address the efficacy of a particular certification 
mechanism and assess the validity of the signaling hypothesis that underlies many of the 
theories based on such certification devices.  
                                                 
4 See Ritter (1998) for a survey of IPO studies prior to the late nineties.  There have been several papers that 
have been published since then.  Due to the sheer volume of the literature, our focus in this paper remains on 
the certification hypothesis in relation to IPO performance, rather than IPOs in general.  
 4
In this paper, we aim to address three main issues related to group affiliation and 
firm performance in the Indian context: 
1. Does affiliation to a private business group, domestic Indian or foreign, act as a 
form of certification at the time of the IPO?  
2. Does the long run survival/success probability of such group-affiliated 
companies differ from that of stand-alone companies?  
3. How do IPOs for firms that are affiliated to business groups, both Indian and 
foreign, perform in the long run, in terms of returns to investors?  
These questions arise in the context of the family business structure which 
dominates a vast proportion of enterprises in India. Ownership and control by families is 
common for many companies in the emerging market countries in Asia and Latin America, 
as well as in some industrialized countries in Europe. A specific instance of this broad 
picture is in India, where large family-owned business groups control several firms through 
complex cross-holdings.  On the one hand, group affiliation can be considered to be a 
positive signal by investors as the company is perceived to be backed by established 
promoters with a track record of good performance. This argument is in line with the 
certification hypothesis mentioned earlier, on the assumption that investors face less 
uncertainty regarding a firm’s value, due to its affiliation with a group, thus leading to less 
underpricing of the IPO. On the other hand, however, the recent literature on family-owned 
business groups, particularly in the Asian context, reveals that many of the controlling 
owners of family-owned business groups may “tunnel” the cash flows from companies 
where they have low cash flow rights to companies where they have high cash flow rights, 
relative to their control rights.5  This evidence suggests that group affiliation may act as a 
negative signal regarding a firm’s value. Thus, the complexity associated with cross-
holdings between group companies increases the outside investors’ uncertainty, leading to 
greater underpricing.  Therefore, there are two competing hypotheses regarding the effect 
of group certification on the firm’s initial performance: the “certification” hypothesis, 
which predicts lower underpricing for group-affiliated companies and the “tunneling” 
hypothesis, which predicts the opposite.  
                                                 
5 See Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999), for example.  
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We aim to bring greater clarity to our understanding of the evolution of pyramidal 
groups, in which companies are connected by a hierarchical structure of ownership 
relationships, by studying the effect of group affiliation on firm performance. The existing 
literature on pyramidal organizations does not attempt to disentangle the web of pyramidal 
organizations. Rather, so far, most of the papers focus on the effect of group affiliation on 
firm performance (based on accounting and market variables) on an ex post basis. In 
contrast, we attempt to address part of the pyramidal organizations’ evolutionary process, 
by examining whether the market recognizes group affiliation as a positive or a negative 
signal ex ante, right at the point where public investors are considering acquiring 
ownership.   In this context, we also address the endogeneity problem that is associated 
with most of the studies related to ownership structure and firm performance (see Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985)). The observed relationship of ownership structure and firm value at a 
given point of time can be the outcome of market forces, which react to the ownership 
structure. Thus, any significant relationship, based on ex post performance, may be 
spurious. However, if the relationship is measured at the time of a firm’s initial entry into 
the stock market, the endogeneity problem will not affect the causal relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value. 
 To our knowledge, this is the second paper that addresses the ex-ante effects of 
group affiliation and the market’s perception of firm value. In an earlier paper, Dewenter, 
Novaes and Pettway (2001) (DNP) address the effects of group affiliation and firm initial 
performance for the IPOs of Japanese firms affiliated to business groups. They conclude 
that group-affiliated companies pay higher costs in the form of higher IPO underpricing, 
due to the additional costs incurred by investors to analyze the complexity associated with 
group affiliated companies. Our study differs from DNP at least in three respects. First, the 
institutional features, economic environment and the group structure vary significantly 
between India and Japan.6 Second, their sample includes only 159 IPOs that were made in 
Japan between 1981 and 1994.  Our study uses a more recent time period (1990-2004) and 
is based on a much larger sample size (2,713 IPOs). Apart from the IPOs of companies 
affiliated to domestic groups (as in the DNP study), we also study those of companies 
                                                 
6 See Khanna and Palepu (1997) for details regarding the differences in the institutional features between 
India and Japanese markets. 
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affiliated to private foreign groups and the government. We are also able to investigate the 
effect of structural changes in the market and the regulatory framework, since the period of 
our study spans three different regulatory regimes in India.  During this period, the Indian 
economy emerged from a highly regulated, state-controlled structure to a relatively 
liberalized, open one. Third, we examine the ex-post performance of companies, after the 
IPO. Our analysis casts some light on the subsequent evaluation of group affiliation, well 
after the IPO, and presents a more complete picture of market perceptions over time.  
 Our overall conclusion is that, similar to DNP, group-affiliated companies 
experienced greater underpricing than their stand-alone counterparts in their IPOs. 
However, we cannot conclude that underpricing occurs to offset the cost of the complexity 
associated with group companies. The reason is that we find IPOs of foreign group-
affiliated companies also exhibit higher underpricing than domestic group affiliated 
companies. If we use DNP’s argument, private foreign groups should be more complex 
with numerous chains of cross holdings. However, most of the (parent) private foreign 
groups in our sample are large multinational companies based in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. These groups do not generally have complex cross holdings and are 
presumed to abide by more stringent disclosure norms.7 Thus, we attribute the higher 
underpricing of the IPOs companies affiliated to groups to investor overreaction to 
reputation. This, in turn, may be the result of strategic action by the management to use 
underpricing as a tool to eliminate competition from the IPOs of lower quality firms. We 
find that companies controlled by the government are the least underpriced. On an ex-post 
basis, group-affiliated companies survived better in the stock market than stand-alone 
companies; however, their long run stock market performance is worse than that of stand-
alone companies that survived.  
  This paper is organized into five sections. The introduction in section 1 is followed 
by a brief review of IPOs and business groups related literature in section 2. A brief 
description of the Indian primary market is also discussed in this section. To keep the 
paper more focused, our discussion of the IPO literature is mainly restricted to papers that 
are related to the certification hypothesis. The description of the data used for this study 
                                                 
7 However, as we point out in our detailed analysis in later sections, private foreign groups do have a conflict 
of interest between the Indian affiliate and the overseas parent, due to royalties and other transfer payments 
paid to the parent,  which may partly explain our results. 
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and the related statistics are presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses our empirical 
results. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Group affiliation and firm performance 
 
The relationship between group affiliation and firm performance has been well 
documented in the finance, strategy and industrial organization literatures.  The broad 
consensus is that the specific institutional context of the economy plays an important role 
in determining the merits and demerits of group affiliation. The evidence, so far, suggests 
that in an environment with a relatively strong institutional infrastructure, enterprises 
engaged in multiple businesses under-perform relative to those that are focused on specific 
industries (excluding leveraged bought out (LBO) Deals).8 This “conglomerate discount,” 
interpreted in the context of business groups, would suggest that there are diseconomies 
associated with group affiliation.   
In contrast, in an environment with a relatively weak institutional infrastructure, 
group-affiliated companies that belong to large, highly diversified groups tend to out-
perform stand-alone companies (see, for example, Khanna and Palepu (2000)). Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) relate these differences in the performance of companies to the 
“substitution” mechanism provided by groups. Firms in markets with a poor institutional 
infrastructure incur higher costs to acquire finance, technology and managerial talent. 
Group-affiliation reduces these costs due to economies of scope and scale, and results in 
better performance than stand-alone companies. On the other hand, if these necessary 
inputs for the growth of firms are easily available in the marketplace, the positive group 
effect may disappear. In such cases, group affiliation could be expensive, due to a lack of 
focus in one particular activity, resulting in under-performance of group-affiliated 
companies compared to their stand-alone counterparts. This would be in line with the 
“conglomerate discount” hypothesis in the industrialized countries, primarily in the United 
States. A recent empirical study by Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2005) on Indian business 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Comment and Jarrell (1995), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Shin and Stulz (1998). 
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groups supports the former conjecture. They found that in the event of financial distress, 
group companies support each other, through intra-group loans, to reduce the negative 
spillover effects of group reputation. However, this support for group firms may come at 
the cost of overall financial performance of group companies.  These two effects need to be 
disentangled, in order to come to a clear-cut conclusion regarding the effects of group 
affiliation on firm performance.  
Interest in the relationship between group affiliation and firm performance has 
increased with the growing importance of corporate governance issues, both in policy-
making and in the academic literature. Many academic papers report that group affiliation 
is detrimental to firm performance, due to the possible expropriation of funds by the 
controlling group. The argument is that group companies are prone to poor internal 
governance, especially when there is excessive control by the family that owns a 
significant stake. This happens especially when the control rights of the ultimate owners 
are out of line with their cash flow rights in a group-affiliated firm. In this context, several 
papers report evidence of such “tunneling” activities - uni-directional, often undisclosed, 
flows of funds, within a group, from firms where the ultimate owner has low cash flow 
rights (compared to control rights) to firms where the ultimate owner has high cash flow 
rights.9    
Thus, the issue of group affiliation and firm performance is not a straightforward 
one. This debate is very pertinent in the Indian context, mainly due to the seemingly 
conflicting results from the Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Bertrand, Mehta and 
Mullainathan (2002) papers. After comparing the accounting and market-based 
performance of group-affiliated Indian companies with similar stand-alone companies, 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) conclude that group affiliation is a positive signal. However, 
they also point out that the positive relationship holds only for well-diversified and 
relatively large business groups. Without distinguishing firms based on the extent of 
diversification, Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) argue that firms affiliated to 
                                                 
9 Several authors document such evidence including Classens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999), Classens, 
Djankov, Lang (2000a), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000b), Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2000), Johnson, and Friedman (2000), Nam (2001), Obata, (2001) and Bertrand, Mehta, 
Mullainathan (2002).   
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groups are prone to “tunneling,” thus causing a reduction in firm value; consequently, 
group affiliation could be a negative signal.  
      However, both these papers, along with similar ones in other countries, examine the 
ex post performance of firms that are affiliated to groups compared to their stand-alone 
counterparts.   If firm group affiliation is regarded as positive or negative, this ought to be 
reflected in the pricing of the firm’s shares when they are offered for sale to outside 
investors in the first place.  In line with this argument, our study aims to examine the ex-
ante perceptions of investors, through the underpricing of IPOs, thus throwing light on the 
seemingly contradictory prior studies in the context of Indian business groups. 
 
2.2 Performance of certification-backed IPOs 
 
Certification-backed IPOs are those that are perceived to be of better quality due to 
the reputation of the certifier or the certification device in question. This certification can 
come in many forms, including a good track record of the company before the IPO, the use 
of a reputed underwriter, venture capital backing, group affiliation, institutional backing, 
analysts’ following, among others. However, the previous theoretical literature suggests 
that the pricing of certification-backed IPOs can go either way.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1999) suggest that investors incur lower cost of information accumulation, if an IPO has 
some backing that signals better quality.  However, Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989), and Chemmanur (1993) suggest that underpricing 
should be more for higher quality IPOs, as they use underpricing as a signaling cost to 
drive low quality issuers out of the market.    
 Appendix 1 summarizes the findings of existing empirical studies on the 
certification hypothesis. Barry, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) and Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) find that underpricing is lower for IPOs of firms with a strong venture capital 
participation compared to those without such investors. These results are consistent with 
the investors’ cost of information accumulation hypothesis. In contradiction to these 
findings, a recent paper by Lee and Wahal (2004), based on a large sample, over a longer 
time period, uses a more robust statistical methodology to find higher underpricing in 
venture-backed IPOs.  These authors explain that the contradiction between the two 
conclusions could be the result of incentives received by venture capitalists from 
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investment bankers to leave more money on the table. This may happen in exchange for 
preferential allocation by investment bankers in other underpriced IPOs to the venture 
capitalists. Loughran and Ritter (2002) also reach a similar conclusion.  
There is a general consensus about underwriter reputation and its effect on IPO 
performance. Logue (1973), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), 
Masksimovic and Unal (1993) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) find that the under 
pricing of IPOs brought to the market by reputable underwriters is lower compared to 
those of non-reputable underwriters. The evidence holds both on a short term and a long-
term basis. Rajan and Servaes (1997) find that, in the long run, IPOs have better stock 
performance, when analysts predict low growth potential rather than high growth potential 
before the offering. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2004) test the certification hypotheses by 
using management quality as a proxy for certification. They find that good management 
quality is negatively related to the extent of underpricing.  
DNP is the only published study, to date, on group affiliation and IPO performance.  
This paper examines the potential for conflicts of interest in Japanese Keiretsu business 
groups. They argue that the underpricing of the IPOs of group-affiliated companies reflects 
the complexity of the group structure, resulting in information acquisition costs to the 
investor.  Hence, there is a trade-off between visibility and complexity. Visibility leads to 
costs for unscrupulous business groups - which prefer to be opaque - as investors can 
detect their opportunistic actions.  On the other hand, complexity is a penalty imposed by 
investors on the business groups, as they incur more costs of information accumulation. If 
the benefits of being complex outweigh the penalty costs imposed by the investors, then, 
business groups may accept the underpricing of their IPOs. In the event, DNP find that the 
underpricing of group-affiliated Keiretsu companies is higher than that of stand-alone 
companies in their sample.  
Thus, the empirical results, so far, suggest a) that the certification may not always 
reduce the costs associated with ex-ante uncertainty of firm value, and b) that firm 
performance varies with the nature of certification. Generally speaking, underwriting 
seems to work better than the other forms of certification. However, in general, it is 
difficult to comment on the optimality of the nature of certification based on these studies.  
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2.3 The Indian primary market 
 
The primary market for equity in India gained momentum after the liberalization 
initiative taken by the government in the early 1990s. Following the improvement in the 
growth rate of the economy at that time, there have been a large number of IPOs during the 
period 1990-2004.10  Unlike the US market, which is the basis for many IPO studies, the 
Indian IPO market has been dominated by retail investors (see Agarwal (2000)). The 
dominance of retail investors is also observed in the secondary market. During the last 
fifteen years, the Indian IPO market has undergone many changes that are widely seen to 
have improved its transparency and efficiency over the past fifteen years. In particular, the 
initial years of liberalization, after 1990-91, witnessed a boom in the Indian IPO market. 
With fewer regulations during this period, many entrepreneurs used the primary market as 
the main vehicle to raise capital. A majority of the IPOs in our sample were made in the 
first five years of liberalization (1990-95). The new spurt in the popular equity culture also 
witnessed several instances of “fly-by-night” entrepreneurs who eroded investors’ 
wealth.11  During 1995-96, the new securities regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI), introduced more regulations on IPO pricing and enforced other 
restrictions on promoters, such as the lock-in period for insider promoters. This resulted in 
a slump in the IPO market, immediately following this period. 
To encourage equity participation after the slump (1995-98), SEBI tried to shore up 
investor confidence by tightening its norms for public issues of equity between 1999 and 
2000. Some of the main changes are related to:  
(1) Financial reporting norms. (For example, the eligibility criterion for making a 
public offer was changed from “actual dividend payout” to “distributable profit,” 
the resulting emphasis on profitability ensured that only companies with a track 
record of financial performance entered the IPO market.)  
                                                 
10 Source: Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Public Issue Guidelines. 
11 The weakness of then-prevailing regulations attracted SEBI’s attention after a major primary market 
scandal related to an infamous IPO by MS Shoes Ltd in 1995. In the same year, SEBI took some initiatives 
by appointing the Malegam Committee to recommend appropriate regulations for closer scrutiny of proposed 
offerings.  See Shah and Thomas (2001) and Rao (2002) for more details.  
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(2) Allotment norms. (For example, the minimum allotment to Qualified 
Institutional Buyers (QIBs) was reduced from 60 per cent to 50 per cent, giving 
greater scope for retail investor participation. Moreover, a minimum allotment of 
25 per cent was reserved for the retail public (investors with an investment below 
Rs 50,000).)  
(3) Cost/efficiency norms. (For example, the secondary market infrastructure of the 
stock exchanges was used for the primary market too; the number of collection 
centers for investor applications for new issues was reduced to cut issue costs.)  
(4) Transparent book building procedures. (Bids were invited from investors to aid 
price discovery.)  
 
Thus, there have been three distinct regimes in the Indian primary market, namely, 
(1) the immediate post-liberalization regime (1990-1995), (2) the initial regulated regime 
(1996-2000), and (3) the reformed regulated regime (2001-2004).   
 
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our definition of group affiliation in our sample is based on the classification of the 
Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The CMIE classifies a company as 
affiliated to a group based on an analysis of company announcements and a qualitative 
assessment of the behavior of the firm in relation to the rest of the group.12 For all 
companies with group affiliations, where appropriate, CMIE assigns each company to a 
unique ownership group, based on the group most closely associated with that company. In 
our research, we use the CMIE group classification to allocate all companies in our sample 
into four categories: stand-alone companies, companies affiliated to private Indian groups, 
those affiliated to private foreign groups (typically multinational companies) and 
government companies. Incidentally, previous studies of group ownership in India such as 
Khanna and Palepu (2000), Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) and Gopalan, Nanda 
and Seru (2005) use the same classification. 
                                                 
12 See the Prowess Users’ Manual, Version 2, p.4, for details. 
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The data-set we assembled consists of attributes on all IPOs recorded in the CMIE 
database on Indian capital markets, between the years 1990 and 2004.  Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of our sample.  We also divide our sample period into three regimes, 
and present a regime-wise classification of our data in the table. As discussed in Section 1, 
Regime 1 (1990-95) was the relatively unregulated IPO period in the immediate aftermath 
of the economic liberalization program launched in 1990-1991. During this time, there 
were few pricing restrictions and most of the IPOs were by firms that attempted to profit 
from the opening up of the Indian economy. Regime 2 (1996-2000) was the initial period 
after the newly constituted securities regulator, SEBI, began exercising strict regulatory 
oversight over the Indian securities market. At the beginning of this period, SEBI 
introduced price and promoter lock-in restrictions and closely scrutinized the IPO market. 
Regime 3 (2001-2004) is the period after the introduction of the book-building process to 
the IPO market, which may have changed the process of price discovery, and hence the 
underpricing in the IPO market. This characterization of the different regimes in the IPO 
market is designed to control for the effect of structural changes in the Indian market on 
the results from our study. Regime 1 witnessed the highest number of IPOs, while regime 3 
had the lowest. Thus, Regime 1 and Regime 3 have been “hot” and “cold” issue periods 
respectively, for the Indian market using the terminology of Ritter (1984). However, unlike 
in the US market, where the hot issue period was driven by a boom in specific industrial 
sectors (e.g. the resources sector), in the Indian market, it was due to structural changes in 
the political economy, primarily through liberalization.  
There are 2,713 IPOs over the fifteen-year period of our study in our data-set. 
During this period, a majority of the IPOs (2,147 or 79 percent) were made by stand-alone 
firms. The IPOs of private Indian group-affiliated firms represent 484 or 18 percent of the 
total sample.  The remaining 82 or 3 percent of the IPOs are shared between firms 
affiliated to the government (33 or a little more than 1%) and those affiliated to foreign 
companies (49 or a little less than 2%). As shown in Table 1, there has been considerable 
variation in the number of IPOs in each year, during our sample period.   Most of the IPOs 
in each category were made in the first half of the 1990s (Regime 1). However, the issue 
size per IPO, in Regimes 2 and 3 (post-1996) is substantially higher compared to the pre-
1996 period (Regime 1). While part of the increase can be attributed to inflation, this broad 
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trend indicates that the IPO market in India became more mature after SEBI’s regulations 
were introduced or tightened during 1995-96, even as the size of the retail investor base 
was growing, due to emergence of a sizeable middle class. As a result, most of the issues 
made in the post-1996 period were by larger companies, which could pass the close 
scrutiny of the regulator. However, the number of issues in Regime 3 reduced to a trickle 
compared to prior years, except for government companies, mainly due to the slump in the 
world capital markets, following the dot-com collapse in 2000.  In the case of government 
companies, the continued volume of IPOs was due to the privatization program of the 
government. The average issue size increased for all firm categories over time, indicating 
the growing maturity of the Indian primary market.   
On average, underpricing is evident across almost all the years in our sample period 
and across the different categories. Typically, the extent of underpricing is low for firms 
affiliated to the government. Government-affiliated companies experienced overpricing, on 
average, for several years in the total study period. In the case of firms affiliated to Indian 
group companies, underpricing on average was as high as 394% in 1999 and came down 
substantially in 2001 and 2002, and was as low as 17.4% in 2002. In 2001, there was only 
one IPO and it was overpriced. On average, stand-alone companies experienced 
underpricing across all years in the study period. The extent of underpricing, on average, 
was the highest in 1999 (689%) and the lowest in 2003 (37.5%). Firms affiliated to private 
foreign groups experienced record underpricing with the highest recorded in 1991 
(1,392%) and the lowest in 1995 (24%). There was a wider variation in other years, but 
those were typically due to an individual outlier in either direction. Table 1 also reports the 
average 30-day standard deviation of daily returns in the post-listing period. As shown in 
the table, the size of the standard deviation amount is not large enough to explain the 
extent of underpricing. For instance, the average underpricing for private Indian groups is 
around 140%; however, the average 30-day standard deviation of return after the listing is 
only 5.7%. This shows that uncertainty in firm valuation in the eyes of the investor cannot 
fully explain the extent of underpricing. Thus, underpricing is likely to be more due to 
investor overreaction, than any post-listing risk to investors.13  
                                                 
13 Another explanation for higher underpricing is provided by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), who argue 
that in many Asian markets, the offer price is set prior to the public issue. A low issue price would lead to 
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.    Table 2 summarizes the pooled cross-sectional statistics relating to IPOs during the 
whole period, 1990-2004. This table summarizes the average values of the key variables 
based on the nature of firm affiliation. Along with average initial return and standard 
deviation, this table contains the average values for other control variables used in this 
study. This table also shows that the highest underpricing, on average, across the fifteen 
year period of our study is for firms affiliated to private foreign groups. Private Indian 
group-affiliated companies, stand-alone companies and government-affiliated companies 
follow in hierarchical order. It is interesting to note that the 30-day standard deviation of 
returns, after listing, also follows the same order. However, the sizes of the average 
underpricing are vastly greater than the sizes of the respective standard deviation of 
returns. This suggests that IPO performance, post-listing, was more due to investor over-
reaction than the (fundamental) uncertainty of the firm value before IPO. Firms that are 
affiliated to large groups attracted more investors and the overreaction led to the high 
listing prices.  
The average asset size of the firms varies based on the nature of the affiliation. 
Firms with government affiliation are relatively large in size at the time of the IPO. The 
IPOs from government-affiliated companies are mostly the result of the government’s 
disinvestment plan. Throughout our sample period, the central and state governments in 
India divested their stakes in some of the large public sector companies through IPOs. The 
underpricing of government-affiliated companies is consistent with the hypothesis that 
reputation (in this case, the backing of the state) should decrease the extent of 
underpricing. These firms also exhibit the lowest standard deviation of returns in the post-
listing period. However, it is surprising to see that the asset sizes of group-affiliated firms 
(both domestic and foreign) are smaller than those of stand-alone firms. It is generally 
expected that a venture from an established group should be of greater size than a similar 
venture from a stand-alone firm. The descriptive statistics also indicate that the IPOs of 
smaller firms are underpriced to a greater extent. Thus, asset size is an important control 
variable in our study.  
                                                                                                                                                    
over subscription, while a high issue price may result in a failure of the issue. To avoid failure, a risk-averse 
issuer may underprice the issue.   
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Another important variable summarized in the table is the share premium. The 
share premium represents the difference between the par value of the share and the issue 
price. The prospectuses of all IPOs clearly state the share premium for a given IPO, with 
the practice continuing even today. Although it is the issue price that matters from an 
economic perspective, there is casual evidence that the share premium, which is widely 
quoted in the prospectus and other related public announcements by the company, acts on 
investor psychology. Firms with a better track record, reputation, and good management 
are widely believed to charge a higher share premium. Thus, premium is believed to act as 
a proxy for the issuing firm’s reputation. Indeed, in Regimes 1 and 2, the SEBI scrutinized 
the logic behind the premium calculation, but even so, there is every chance that even low 
quality projects charged high premium during the IPO market boom.14  There is anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that investor resentment by the end of Regime 1 was partly due to this 
phenomenon. Investors lost their investments by investing in such artificially inflated IPO 
prices. Table 2 shows that the average premium charged by all affiliated firms is higher 
than stand-alone firms.      
The subscription details for IPOs by type of investor – promoters (insiders), the 
public, institutions, and others - are also summarized in Table 2. The promoters’ 
participation figures clearly show that most of the government-affiliated companies are 
part of government disinvestment plans. The average promoters’ subscription for 
government-affiliated firms is only 3.7%. The other affiliated firms (private Indian groups 
and private foreign groups) have a higher promoter participation compared to stand-alone 
firms. The public participation in all IPOs is quite similar. However, the institutional 
participation varies based on the nature of group affiliation. Government-affiliated 
companies, on average, have the highest participation by institutional investors. (At that 
time, several large domestic institutional investors were controlled or tightly regulated by 
the government.) Stand-alone companies come next. It is again surprising to see that 
institutional participation is quite low in both categories of group-affiliated companies. It is 
generally presumed that higher (lower) institutional investors’ participation signals higher 
(lower) quality of the firm making the IPO. However, it can also be argued that higher 
                                                 
14 SEBI tightened its norms for IPO pricing due to widespread criticism of the lack of oversight of offerings 
during Regime 1. 
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institutional participation is not desirable in the case of group-affiliated companies, from 
the perspective of the controlling group, since higher participation of institutional investors 
reduces the group’s control over the firm and subjects it to institutional scrutiny.15 
 
 
 
4  Results 
 
4.1 Preliminary results 
 
Following the preliminary insights from Tables 1 and 2, we extend our analysis to 
investigate the statistical significance of the differences between the key variables across 
the different categories of firms. Table 3 presents the results of the tests of the mean 
differences between the key variables. We use analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests to 
evaluate whether there is any evidence that the means of the different populations differ. 
However, if we have more than two sub-groups (we have four categories in our analysis) it 
is inappropriate to compare each pair using a simple t-test because of the problem of 
multiple testing. For this reason, we used the Tukey multiple comparison test, which 
compares differences between the means with appropriate adjustments for multiple testing 
(see Tukey (1977) and Bland and Altman (1995)). The Tukey multiple comparison test, 
like the simple t-test and the pair-wise ANOVA, assumes that the data from the different 
groups come from populations where the observations have a normal distribution and the 
standard deviation is the same for each group.  
Table 3 tests the mean difference of each group with the other groups. For instance, 
the first row, third column, shows the difference between the means of private Indian 
group affiliated companies and stand-alone companies for initial return variable. The p-
values are shown in the parentheses below each mean difference value. The initial returns 
or the extent of underpricing between group-affiliated companies, both private Indian and 
foreign, and stand-alone companies is significantly different. The positive mean difference 
value indicates that the domestic group companies’ mean value for initial return is higher 
                                                 
15 In many cases, institutional investors obtain a seat on the boards of companies where they have a stake. 
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than stand-alone companies. Likewise, the mean difference values can be interpreted for 
other variables, and comparisons between other groups. The initial return of government-
affiliated companies is not statistically different from that of other categories. However, the 
asset size is significantly different from that of other groups. Table 3 shows that, in terms 
of asset size, the mean difference value between group-affiliated companies and their 
stand-alone counterparts is not statistically significant. The issue size of domestic group-
affiliated companies is larger than for stand-alone companies and smaller than for 
government affiliated companies. The share premium charged by domestic group-affiliated 
companies is higher than for stand-alone firms and smaller than for foreign group affiliated 
companies.  
The difference in means between the proportions of promoter participation is not 
significantly different between group-affiliated and stand-alone companies. However, there 
is a highly statistically significant difference between group-affiliated companies and 
government-affiliated companies. The same results hold for public participation. The 
finding regarding institutional investor participation is also not that surprising, as discussed 
in Section 3. The only mean difference value that is statistically significant is between 
private Indian group-affiliated companies and stand-alone companies. The institutional 
investors’ participation for stand-alone companies is higher than domestic group affiliated 
companies, which is in line with the discussion in the previous section. In summary, the 
mean-difference test results provide enough evidence that group affiliated firms (both 
domestic and foreign) are quite different from stand-alone companies and government-
affiliated companies on several dimensions.   
 
4.2 Regression results 
 
Table 4 presents regression results of the relationship between the extent of 
underpricing and firm characteristics. We consider five sets of independent variables.  The 
first set consists of firm characteristics such as issue size and asset size. The second set 
consists of the group affiliation dummies for three of the four categories we have defined.  
(We do not have a dummy variable for the government companies, since that is absorbed 
in the constant term.)  The third set of characteristics relates to the industry dummies for 
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three of the four industry sectors identified – banking, other financial services, 
manufacturing, and other services. (The “other services” category of industries does not 
have a dummy variable attached to it.) The fourth set of variables is the dummies for the 
three regimes (with Regime 3 being excluded) defined earlier that sub-divide our time 
series. The last set is the investor dummies for promoter, public and institutional 
participation. (The “others” category of investor participation is excluded.)   
We estimate four regressions for different sets of independent variables, in order to 
assess the incremental impact of each set of variables on the extent of underpricing. Even 
though asset size varies significantly across the different categories we have defined, we 
find no evidence of any significant relationship between asset size and the extent of 
underpricing. The same holds for the issue size of the IPO: the size of the issue does not 
influence the extent of underpricing. The domestic group dummy is positive and highly 
significant in all the four regressions. Thus, after controlling for other factors, we find that 
being part of a private Indian group influences the extent of underpricing in a positive 
manner. The same positive relationship for the extent of underpricing holds for firms 
affiliated to private foreign groups. The coefficients for the industry dummies are all 
insignificant. Thus, underpricing is seen across all industry categories and it is not 
industry-specific in terms of its relative importance. Of course, it is possible that our 
industry classification is too coarse to detect such effects, particularly if they vary over 
time.   We could not examine this issue in greater detail due to paucity of detailed industry 
classification data, along the lines of data in the industrialized countries. 
Our results relating to the variations across regimes are reported in Regressions 3 
and 4 in Table 4. The coefficients for Regimes 1 and 2 are negative and significant. This 
indicates that firms that undertook IPOs in Regimes 1 and 2 were, on average, relatively 
overpriced compared to the firms that issued equity in Regime 3. Higher underpricing in 
Regime 3 questions the efficacy of SEBI regulations for making the IPO market more 
investor-friendly and transparent. It can also be argued that the market conditions during 
Regime 2 were dull after the pricking of the IPO “bubble” at the end of Regime 1, 
reflecting investors’ disenchantment with the returns on their investments in the previous 
regime, which led to lower listing prices in the subsequent period. During Regime 3, this 
trend was reversed as a consequence of SEBI’s intervention to attract investors and IPOs 
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from large, well-known companies with closer regulatory scrutiny, leading once again to 
investor overreaction and greater underpricing.  
Contrary to our expectations, we find that promoter participation in the IPOs has a 
marginally significant influence the extent of underpricing. However, public and 
institutional investor participation reduces the extent of underpricing. This indicates that 
public and institutional interest signals firm quality and improves the valuation. However, 
our result on institutional affiliation contradicts the conclusion of Hamao, Packer and 
Ritter (2000) for the Japanese market: they find a positive relationship between 
institutional affiliation and the extent of underpricing.  
 
4.3  Post IPO performance 
 
4.3.1 Firm survival analysis 
 
The regression-based results discussed in the above sections are inconclusive with 
respect to group affiliation and firm performance. The higher underpricing for group-
affiliated companies may indicate that the “complexity of groups” argument made by DNP 
holds even for the Indian market. However, higher underpricing for firms affiliated to 
private foreign groups, a majority of which are US and UK conglomerates, poses a 
contradiction to the complexity argument. The private foreign groups used in this study are 
generally regarded as quite transparent, with most of them being managed by 
professionals, rather than family members who typically manage companies in the private 
Indian business groups. It is generally presumed that firms affiliated to foreign groups are 
better run and less likely to divert firm resources to outsiders than those in the private 
Indian groups.  On the other hand, many of these firms affiliated to private foreign groups 
are subsidiaries of multinational companies.  Since these firms are only partially owned by 
the parent companies, there is an inherent conflict of interest between the parent and the 
subsidiary, particularly with regard to brand royalties, technology fees, and other transfer 
payments. The issue is whether the presumed professionalism of the affiliates of 
multinational companies is in conflict with their allegiance to their parents.    
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We investigate this issue further by examining the post-IPO performance of firms 
in the various categories described earlier. We estimate the success probability of a given 
firm based on the category of affiliation by using an ordered probit model. We use the 
current listing band of a given IPO in the Bombay Stock Exchange in India (BSE) as a 
proxy for the long-run success of the IPO. The BSE classifies all listed stocks into different 
quality bands, namely, A, B1, B2, C and Z groups.16  Shares that are classified in the A 
band are generally the large, liquid, blue chips of the Indian stock market. B1, B2 and C 
follow in the quality hierarchy from high to low. The firms that are classified as Z are 
usually failures. These companies are classified as such, either because they declared 
bankruptcy, or they violated the listing norms of the BSE, and were, therefore, suspended 
from trading. Thus, the BSE classification acts as a barometer for a firm’s success in the 
Indian stock market, somewhat akin to a rating from a credit rating agency. The ordered 
probit model estimates the probability of failure by taking values 1 to 4 for A, B1, B2 and 
Z categories respectively.17   
The results are presented in Table 5. We used both private Indian and private 
foreign group dummies that take the value 1, if the firm is affiliated to a private domestic 
or foreign group, respectively (and 0 otherwise). The negative and significant coefficients 
for both the domestic and private foreign group dummy variables indicate that the failure 
probability for a firm affiliated to either a private domestic or foreign group is lower than 
for a stand-alone firm. In other words, if a firm is affiliated to either a private domestic or 
foreign group, the probability of the firm listing in the lower bands is low. The results also 
indicate that, on average, firms that experienced higher underpricing in their IPOs have a 
lower probability of survival.18 The size of the company, measured by assets, and the 
extent of promoter or institutional participation in the IPO do not affect the probability of 
firm survival over time. Also, IPOs made in Regime 1 had a greater chance of failure 
compared to those in the other two regimes. This is consistent with the opportunistic 
actions of “fly-by-night” entrepreneurs in Regime 1 as described in Section 2.3.  This may 
be due to the fact that very few firms ventured into the capital market during this period, 
                                                 
16 We did not include the C band in our analysis as there are very few companies in this band in our sample.  
17 We also ran the probit model with just two classes, A, B1 and B2, in one class with a value, and Z with a 
value 0.  The results are qualitatively similar, although less sharp than the ones reported here. 
18 We did not use issue size as an independent variable, as one would expect its effect to wear off over time. 
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and those that did so tended to be the robust ones, perhaps due to the closer scrutiny of the 
regulator and the more demanding market conditions. There are no patterns in the 
relationship between the nature of industry affiliation and the survival odds, except for the 
banking industry. All industry affiliations have equal chances of failure relative to the 
banking sector, which seems to have a lower probability of failure.  This finding may be 
due to the additional requirement of scrutiny by the banking regulator, in addition to the 
securities regulator. 
 It should be noted that the chances of more stand-alone getting listed in the A and 
B1 bands should be higher than group-affiliated firms, based purely on the relative number 
of issues by stand-alone companies issues compared to domestic private group-affiliated 
firms. Stand-alone companies represent around 80 percent of IPOs issued in the Indian 
market, while group-affiliated companies represent only 18 percent of the IPO market. 
However, these numbers need not be reflected in the probability of success of any 
individual firm. Also, as shown earlier in Tables 1, 2 and 3, the size of domestic group-
affiliated companies is not significantly different from that of stand-alone companies. The 
ordered probit analysis reinforces this conclusion in terms of probability of success: size is 
not significant for the likelihood of success of firms making the IPO. Thus, after 
controlling for other variables that might affect their performance, both private domestic 
and foreign group-affiliated companies survived better in the post-IPO period, compared to 
stand-alone companies. The reason for better survival odds could be due to the implicit 
contracts between group firms to help each other, in a weak legal system, in the event of 
distress, as argued by Bull (1987) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In this connection, 
Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2005) find supporting evidence that Indian business groups, 
support each other, through intra-group lending, in case of financial distress.19 They 
concluded that these supporting actions are to safeguard the group’s reputation in the 
capital market. Our survival analysis supports this argument. Group firms might survive 
better, post IPO, perhaps due to this supporting mechanism, which is not available to 
stand-alone companies. 
                                                 
19 There is anecdotal evidence that this happens very often.  In a well-publicized episode involving Tata 
Finance Ltd, the group companies of the Tata group provided financial assistance to bail it out of financial 
distress in 2003.  This happened despite the fact that some of the group companies involved had no 
obligation to do so, since they were independent legal entities. 
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4.4 Long run performance of IPOs 
 
We next analyze the long-run return performance of IPOs for firms in the various 
categories discussed earlier. The results are reported in Tables 6 and 7. Consistent with the 
IPO literature relating to the evidence in other countries (see, for example, Ritter, 1991), 
we find that the average long-run return performance of firms, post their IPOs, is 
significantly negative.  This has been consistently true for different horizons - 12, 24 and 
36 month windows - indicating the systematic over-optimism of investors regarding the 
performance of new investment opportunities.20    
In Table 6, we report the long run return performance statistics for our data-set. We 
use both the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and the Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Return (CAAR) measures for our long-run performance analysis. These are the 
standard metrics used in the IPO literature and represent different ways of defining the 
post-listing, long-term, return: BHAR is the risk-adjusted return based on buying at the 
beginning of the period and selling it at the end, taking into account any intervening 
distributions, while CAAR is the cumulative average return assuming compounding in 
each period (see, for example, Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000)). A more formal 
representation is as follows: 
CAAR  = 1/n CARi, 
where CARi = Σt= 1 to T (Rit –Rmt). 
BHAR = 1/n BHERi,  
where BHERi = Πt=1 to T (1+Rit) – Π (1+Rmt) 
 
BHER is the Buy-and-Hold Excess Return; Rit = the return of firm i and Rmt is the market 
bench mark return (BSE 100 index return) in period t; the horizon date T = 12 or 24 or 36 
months. 
Among the different firm categories we had defined earlier, we find, to our 
surprise, that the magnitude of negative long-run stock market performance is greater for 
                                                 
20 See Ritter (1991), Levis (1993) and Agarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993), for US, UK and Latin American 
markets respectively. 
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private foreign groups and private Indian groups compared to stand-alone companies. 
These are significantly different from zero for both these categories, over all three horizons 
we define, and also using both measures of return performance. 
While this result appears to be in conflict with the findings from the ordered probit 
analysis, closer examination suggests that this is not the case.  One can resolve this 
seeming contradiction based on three arguments:  
1. The criteria for being classified in the better quality groups are not based purely 
on stock market performance. Other aspects of the stock, such as stock market 
liquidity, play a role. 
2. The better survival odds of group-affiliated companies do not necessarily 
indicate superior market performance.  In fact, low returns and high investments in 
fixed assets may go together, particularly in the pyramidal structure of family 
business growth, as argued by Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005).21   
3. The results in Table 6 may also indicate long term reversals in firm valuation 
after substantial initial post-listing returns.  
The results for government-affiliated IPOs are strikingly different from the rest of 
our sample. These firms have positive (albeit, statistically insignificant) long run 
performance. It should be noted that, the government-affiliated IPOs experienced very low 
underpricing. The results based on the BHAR measure are higher than those based on the 
CAAR measure. This could be due to the over-estimation issue associated with the BHAR 
measure, as noted by Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000).   
Table 7 investigates whether there is any significant variation in the long-run 
performance across the various categories in our sample. We use the mean differences 
between the categories with similar methodology used in Table 3. We use the Average 
Abnormal Return (AAR) as the performance measure22. AAR is defined as follows: 
AARi = 1/n Σt= 1 to T (Rit –Rmt), 
where Rit = return of firm i and Rmt is the market bench mark return (BSE 100 index return) 
in period t, and the horizon date T = 12 or 24 or 36 months.   
                                                 
21 They argue that this is mainly due to the unique advantages that the controlling family can derive through 
the ease of expropriation achieved by driving a wedge between cash flow rights and control rights.  
22 We also used BHAR as the measure of performance. The results are qualitatively similar to AAR. For 
brevity we did not report them in the paper. 
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We find that there is no significant difference in long-run performance between the 
four groups.  There appear to be no clear differences between the post-IPO return measures 
that are statistically significant. This confirms the conjecture that long-run 
underperformance, similar to other markets, is more a general phenomenon across all types 
of firms.23 Thus, the negative performance of firms affiliated to domestic and foreign 
groups is not that significant on a relative basis.      
In summary, both short-run and long-run performance supplemented with the 
survival analysis indicate that firms that are affiliated to both domestic and foreign groups 
exhibit greater investor over-reaction compared to stand-alone firms and firms affiliated to 
the government. This cannot be attributed to the “duration effect” proposed by Chowdhry 
and Sherman (1996), as the duration between opening of the issue and its listing on the 
exchange is more or less the same for all stocks. This leads us to conclude that group 
reputation might cause such high overreactions. Higher under-pricing may also be a 
strategic choice for group-affiliated companies to compete with low quality stand-alone 
issuers as argued by Allen and Faulhaber (1989) Chemmanur (1989) and Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989). 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
We document the results of a comprehensive study of the Indian IPO market 
focusing on the effect of group affiliation on the initial performance in the post-listing 
market. We use a relatively large sample of 2,713 IPOs that were issued in India, from 
1990 to 2004, to test whether group affiliation affects the extent of underpricing. We 
consider two competing hypotheses on the relationship between group affiliation and the 
extent of underpricing. The certification hypothesis suggests that in less developed capital 
markets, business groups form internal capital markets to help member companies in the 
case of financial distress. Thus, group affiliation acts as a positive signal, resulting in lower 
                                                 
23 There is a long standing debate on mis-measurement issues related to the methodology used to calculate 
long-run performance. For instance, Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) show that the choice of performance 
measurement directly determines both size and power of statistical tests. However, we believe that the 
magnitude as well as the consistency of our results, for different horizons and for both measures of return 
performance, is striking, notwithstanding this theoretical argument. 
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underpricing compared to standalone companies. On the other hand, the “tunneling” 
hypothesis argues that due to excessive control of the family over group companies, the 
controlling family may expropriate the future cash flows of the affiliated companies, where 
they have relatively low cash flow rights. Thus, group affiliation acts as a negative signal, 
resulting in greater underpricing.   In our analysis, we find that underpricing is greater for 
firms affiliated to groups. Our results hold for both private domestic as well as private 
foreign groups (affiliated to multi-national companies) that are presumed to be more 
transparent; hence, we cannot attribute underpricing to the tunneling effect or the 
complexity of group affiliation as argued by DNP.  
We extend our analysis beyond DNP’s framework to uncover the possible reasons 
for higher underpricing in both domestic and private foreign groups, by examining the 
post-IPO success of the firms. Our survival analysis indicates that group affiliated 
companies survive better than stand-alone firms. We conjecture that this could be due to a 
better support mechanism for group-affiliated companies compared to their stand-alone 
counterparts, in the case of financial distress, as argued by Gopalan, Nanda and Seru 
(2005): business groups try to preserve their market reputation by bailing out member 
firms that are in financial distress. Thus, group affiliation acts as a positive signal to the 
market. However, our long-run IPO performance results, measuring the stock market 
performance of the firm, are consistent with the results in other countries:  in the long run, 
firms that were underpriced in their IPOs experience negative performance.  
We also report many other stylized facts of an unexplored emerging primary 
market. Our overall conclusion is that the higher underpricing in group-affiliated 
companies is mainly due to the over-reaction of investors, and thus, reflects investor 
reaction to the reputation of group firms. Groups may also use underpricing as a strategic 
choice to attract more investors in competition with low-quality issuers from the market.  
Our study raises a number of issues for future research.  Are business groups the 
optimal organizational structure in the emerging economies?  Do business groups hinder or 
help entrepreneurial growth in these countries?  Will the role of these groups diminish as 
markets develop in these economies and reliance on group support mechanisms becomes 
less important?  We believe that cross-sectional evidence from other markets will throw 
light on these questions.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Summary of prior research results on the relationship between the nature of 
certification and the extent of underpricing of IPOs 
 
 
Author/s Nature of 
Certification 
Relationship 
between the 
Nature of 
Certification and 
the Extent of 
Underpricing 
Country Study 
Period 
Beatty (1989) Auditor 
Reputation  
Negative US 1975-84 
Barry, 
Muscarella, 
Peavy, and 
Vetsuypens 
(1990) 
Venture 
Capitalist 
Affiliation 
Negative US 1978-87 
James and Weir 
(1990) 
Borrowing 
relationship with 
Banks 
Negative US 1980-83 
Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) 
Venture 
Capitalist 
Affiliation 
Negative US 1983-87 
Rajan and 
Servaes (1997)  
Degree of 
Analysts 
Coverage 
Positive US 1985-87 
Carter, Dark and 
Singh (1997) 
Underwriter 
Reputation 
Negative US 1979-91 
Hamao, Packer 
and Ritter (2000) 
Institutional 
Affiliation 
Positive Japan 1989-95 
Dewenter, 
Novaes and 
Pettway (2001) 
Business Group 
Affiliation 
Positive Japan 1975-87 
Lee and Wahal 
(2004) 
Venture 
Capitalist 
Affiliation 
Positive US 1999-00 
Chemmanur and 
Paeglis (2004) 
Management 
Quality 
Negative US 1993-96 
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Table 1    Year Wise Summary Statistics for IPOs made in India during 1990-2004 
 
This table summarizes the data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), made in India during 1990-04, on a yearly basis, for the whole period and for sub-periods (regimes). The 
data are classified into four groups, based on the nature of the ownership of the firm making the IPO, namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-alone Companies, Government 
Companies and Private Foreign Groups. The initial return is calculated as the proportionate change between the issue price and the first listing price on the stock exchange (the 
Bombay Stock Exchange). The total amount raised is presented in Indian Rupees. A crore is 10 million and the current foreign exchange rate (November 2005) is about 45 Indian 
Rupees to one US $. The data are also classified into three regimes based on the major structural changes that occurred in the Indian primary market. Regime 1 (Reg 1) (1990-95) 
is the IPO boom period, soon after the liberalization of the Indian economy, when the regulatory restrictions were mild. In Regime 2 (Reg 2)(1996-00) restrictions were introduced 
regarding pricing and other aspects of the issue. Regime 3 (Reg 3) (2001-04) is the period after the introduction of a transparent book-building process for price discovery.  
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Reg 1 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Reg 2 2001 2002 2003 2004 Reg 3 Grand 
Total 
Private Indian Groups                    
No. of Issues 7 33 74 100 129 72 415 32 7 - 10 12 61 1 4 1 2 8 484 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
147 497.7 1045.7 1334.3 2354.7 4389.1 9768.0 1290.9 1086 - 1111.9 1591.6 5080.4 49.89 1561.5 95 402.1 2108.5 16957 
Average Issue Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 
8.61 15.08 14.12 13.34 17.03 30.12 17.36 14.51 35.28 - 111.19 135.13 57.72 49.89 506.05 95 201.02 253.19 25.55 
Average Issue Premium  
(Issue price/Face value) 
1.41 1.5 1.23 4.67 2.14 2.6 3.05 2.6 1.12 - 11.2 2.63 4.29 1 5.25 5 1.1 2.83 4.63 
Average Initial Return 
(%) 
85.5 299.5 219.68 141.84 93.61 34.87 145.83 18.08 38.29 - 393.54 41.33 122.81 -32.5 17.4 140 80.03 51.23 140.07 
Average 30 day Standard 
Deviation 
3.70 4.49 2.92 7. 80 5.51 5.46 5.4 2.89 3.89 - 24.46 6.98 7.52 1.01 7.17 4.19 5.74 5.61 5.74 
Stand-alone Companies                    
No. of Issues 12 40 129 270 535 738 1724 329 16 8 15 42 410 10 - 2 1 13 2147 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
130 190.3 788.94 1436.9 3382.5 4432.1 10360 1900.2 189.9 207.3 238.48 814.23 3350.1 304.1 - 32.6 16.95 353.66 14065 
Average Issue  Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 
12.9 4.64 6.11 5.32 6.32 6.01 6.01 5.7 11.87 29.62 15.89 19.38 8.20 17.12 - 16.3 16.95 16.97 6.62 
Average Issue Premium  
(Issue price/ Face Value) 
1.33 1.01 1.08 1.36 1.58 1.81 1.60 1.26 1 1.24 1.26 1.58 1.28 2.37 - 1 1 1.55 2.14 
Average Initial Return 
(%) 
251 241.9 97.76 67.50 86.53 43.94 131.47 80.36 131.0 62.8 688.62 52.24 203.01 70.69 - 37.5 50 52.73 78.78 
Average 30 day Standard 
Deviation 
8.38 5.14 2.59 2.86 3.36 3.01 3.13 1.93 3.17 3.23 13.68 2.99 2.68 2.35 - 4.60 3.06 2.91 3.06 
Government Companies                    
No. of Issues 1 - 1 1 9 2 14 2 5 - 1 2 10 1 4 1 3 9 33 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
- - 217.36 525 765.29 2478 3985.6 1030 1287. - 125 205.1 2647.1 150 937.6 240 715.1 2042.7 8675 
Average Issue Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 
120 - 217.36 525 85.03 1239 306.58 515 257.54 - 125 102.54 264.77 150 234.42 240 238.35 226.97 271.13 
Average Issue Premium  
(Issue price/ Face Value) 
1 - 1.5 1 3.05 2 2.5 5 1.5 - 1.5 4.75 2.66 4.27 1 1 5.33 2.98 3.5 
Average Initial Return 
(%) 
-71 - 370 21.42 55.04 -20.04 106.60 146.98 10.94 - 23 -4.5 44.105 -5 33.58 49.1 52.18 32.46 53.62 
Average 30 day Standard 
Deviation 
55.3 - 1.38 4.07 4.38 2.57 7.5 2.78 6.47 - 0.63 0.33 4.92 0.25 1.14 0.38 2.09 1.27 1.27 
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Private Foreign Groups                    
No. of Issues 2 9 6 7 8 7 39 3 - 1 1 4 9 - - - 1 1 49 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
7.73 80.4 99.07 119.73 170.61 70.98 548.52 47.38 - 1.75 55.13 291.04 395.3 - - - 365 365 1309 
Average Issue Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 
3.86 8.93 16.51 17.10 21.32 21.32 14.06 10.14 - 1.75 55.13 58.54 37.60 - - - 365 365 24.99 
Average Issue Premium  
(Issue price/ Face Value) 
5.25 6.83 6.63 4.5 7.42 2.5 5.71 2.41 - 4 4.5 2.37 2.80 - - - 7 7 8.76 
Average Initial Return 
(%) 
275 1392. 157.5 261.3 92.70 24.28 367.13 44.5 - 1899 152.2 356.54 613.06 - - - 26.98 26.98 351.01 
Average 30 day Standard 
Deviation 
2.22 9.99 2.88 3.09 2.90 3.01 4.56 1.17 - 8.73 94.4 5.49 14.27 - - - 5.49 36.78 7.08 
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Table 2 Comprehensive Descriptive Statistics for IPOs made in India during 1990-2004 
 
This table summarizes the data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), made in India during 1990-04, in terms of various descriptive statistics. The data are classified into four 
groups, based on the nature of the ownership of the firm making the IPO, namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-alone Companies, Government Companies and Private Foreign 
Groups. The initial return is calculated as the proportionate change between the issue price and the first listing price on the stock exchange (the Bombay Stock Exchange). The 
average asset size and the issue size are presented in crores of Indian Rupees. A crore is 10 million and the current foreign exchange rate (November 2005) is about 45 Indian 
Rupee to one US $. The average 30-day standard deviation is calculated by using the stock returns from day 1 to day 30, after the stock was listed in the stock exchange. Each 
variable’s standard deviation is reported in parentheses. 
 
Variables of Interest Private Indian Groups  Stand-alone Companies  Government Companies  Private Foreign 
Groups 
 
Average Initial return (%) 
  
140.07 
(349.46) 
 
78.78 
(285.44) 
 
53.62 
(100.06) 
 
351.01 
( 855.99) 
Average 30 day Standard Deviation (%)  5.74 
(11.29) 
3.06 
(4.77) 
1.27 
(10.14) 
7.08 
(14.14) 
Average  Asset Size at the time of IPO (In Rs. Crores)  102.83 
(384.82) 
360.44 
(251.05) 
17194.92 
(20963.42) 
64.21 
(133.94) 
Average Issue Size (In Rs. Crores)  28.01 
(85.33) 
12.7 
(11.97) 
280.15 
(427.08) 
27.90 
(57.03) 
Average Issue Premium (Issue price/Face value)  4.63 
(11.08) 
2.14 
(2.70) 
3.5 
(2.95) 
8.76 
(24.09) 
Average Promoters’ Subscription (%)  17.34 
(22.92) 
12.54 
(16.64) 
3.76 
(18.90) 
14.82 
(26.91) 
Average Public Subscription (%)  68.63 
(27.01) 
64.38 
(20.97) 
69.50 
(27.22) 
75.28 
(28.90) 
Average Institutional and Others Subscription (%)  14.03 
(19.10) 
23.08 
(16.25) 
26.74 
(18.32) 
9.90 
(17.21) 
Number of observations  484 2147 33 49 
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Table 3 One-Way ANOVA Multiple Means Comparison Test for IPOs of Private Indian Groups, Stand-alone Companies, Government 
Companies, and Private Foreign Groups, during 1990-2004 
 
This table is based on data for 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), made in India during 1990-04. The data are classified into four groups, based on the nature of the ownership of 
the firm making the IPO, namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-alone Companies, Government Companies and Private Foreign Groups. The initial return is calculated as the 
proportionate change between the issue price and the first listing price in the stock exchange (Bombay Stock Exchange). The asset size and issue size are presented in crores of 
Indian Rupees. A crore is 10 million and the current foreign exchange rate (November 2005) is about 45 Indian Rupee to one US $. The test statistic presented below relates to the 
differences between the means in different groups based on the Tukey multiple comparison test. This test allows a comparison of the means simultaneously for multiple samples. 
For instance, in the case of the initial return variable, the Private Indian Group sample mean is first compared with the other three groups. The Stand-alone Companies sample is 
also compared in the same manner, but, leaving out the Private Indian Group sample, which was compared in the first set, etc. The * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
level. The p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Private Indian 
Groups  
Stand-alone 
Companies 
Government 
Companies 
Private Foreign 
Groups 
 Private Indian 
Groups  
Stand-alone 
Companies 
Government 
Companies 
 Private Foreign 
Groups 
Initial return     Premium     
Private Indian 
Groups  
- 63.26* 
(0.001) 
83.71 
(0.427) 
 
-214.26* 
(0.000) 
 - 2.68* 
(0.000) 
1.12 
(0.797) 
-4.12* 
(0.001) 
Stand-alone 
Companies 
  
- 
20.44 
(0.981) 
-277.53* 
(0.000) 
  - -1.55 
(0.564) 
-6.18* 
(0.000) 
Government 
Companies 
  - -297.98* 
(0.000) 
   - -5.25* 
(0.005) 
Private Foreign 
Groups 
   -     - 
 Asset Size     Promoters’ 
Subscription 
    
Private Indian 
Groups  
- 68.38 
(0.966) 
-1792.07* 
(0.000) 
38.61 
(1.000) 
 - 0.11 
(1.00) 
16.17* 
(0.000) 
-3.65 
(0.654) 
Stand-alone 
Companies 
 - -1716.45* 
(0.000) 
-29.76 
(1.000) 
  - 16.16* 
(0.000) 
-3.64 
(0.626) 
Government 
Companies 
  - 1713.69* 
(0.000) 
   - -19.83* 
(0.000) 
Private Foreign 
Groups 
   -     - 
Issue Size      Public 
Subscription 
    
Private Indian 
Groups  
- 20.95* 
(0.000) 
-252.13* 
(0.000) 
0.113 
(1.000) 
 - 3.15 
(1.00) 
14.72* 
(0.003) 
0.62 
(0.998) 
Stand-alone 
Companies 
 - -1.55 
(0.564) 
-6.81* 
(0.000) 
  - -17.87* 
(0.000) 
-2.53 
(0.904) 
Government 
Companies 
  - -5.25* 
(0.005) 
   - 15.34* 
(0.029) 
Private Foreign 
Groups 
   -     - 
Institutional 
Subscription 
         
Private Indian 
Groups  
- -3.29* 
(0.004) 
1.73 
(0.951) 
2.76 
(0.776) 
     
Stand-alone 
Companies 
 - 5.02 
(0.386) 
1.03 
(0.995) 
     
Government 
Companies 
  - 1.02 
(0.955) 
     
Private Foreign 
Groups 
   -      
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Table 4 Regression Results with Initial Return as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table is based on data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), made in India during 1990-04. The table presents multiple regression results based on the following equations 
(Note: For brevity, only one regression equation is reported. The other equations are nested in the equation 4 below, but with fewer variables on the right hand side).  
 
Regression 4: Initial return = c + a1 Asset Size + a2 Issue Size+a3 Private Indian Groups dummy + a4 Stand-alone companies dummy + a5 Government companies dummy + a6 
Private Foreign Group dummy + a7 Banking companies dummy + a8 Financial services dummy + a9 Manufacturing companies dummy +a10 Other Services companies dummy + 
a11 Regime1 + a12 Regime2 + a13 Regime3 + a14 Promoters’ contribution + a15 Public investors’ contribution + a16 Institutional investors’ contribution + a17 Other investors‘ 
contribution + e  
 
The regressions are aimed to test the relationship between underpricing and variables of interest, namely: asset size, issue size, Private Indian Group dummy, Stand-alone 
Companies dummy, Government Companies dummy, Private Foreign Group dummy,  Banking Companies dummy, Financial Services (ex-banking) Companies dummy, 
Manufacturing Companies dummy, Other Sectors dummy. Promoter’s contribution represents the percentage subscribed by the promoters for the IPO; Public investors’ 
contribution represents the percentage subscribed by the public for the IPO; Institutional investors’ contribution  represents the percentage subscribed by the institutional investors, 
while other investors’ contribution  (omitted here as an independent variable) represents  the rest of the participation in the IPO.  Apart from these variables, the table also reports 
the coefficients for the regime dummies. Regime 1 is a dummy variable for regime 1 (1990-1995); Regime 2 is a dummy variable for regime 2 (1996-2000); Regime 3 is a dummy 
variable for regime 3 (2001-2004.  The *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The t-values are in parentheses. 
Independent Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
C 74.24 
 (9.86)*** 
75.38  
(8.64)*** 
367.84  
(4.02)*** 
621.47  
(3.93)*** 
Asset Size (at  the time of IPO) -0.00 
 (-0.13) 
-0.00  
(-0.13) 
-0.005 
 (-1.49) 
-0.005  
(-1.55) 
Issue Size -0.108 
 (-1.01) 
-0.115 
 (-1.08) 
-0.09 
 (-0.93) 
-0.074 
 (-0.71) 
Private Indian Group dummy   65.54 
 (3.95)*** 
65.52  
(3.95)*** 
63.14  
(3.79)*** 
59.05  
(3.64)*** 
Stand-alone Companies dummy - - - - 
   Government Companies dummy 15.06  
(0.21) 
15.48  
(0.20) 
3.19  
(0.04) 
-1.80 
(-0.02) 
Private Foreign Group dummy 279.79  
(5.85)*** 
277.63 
 (5.81)*** 
270.13  
(5.66)*** 
267.03 
(5.78)*** 
Banking Companies dummy  2.84 
 (0.04) 
21.95 
 (0.31) 
21.79  
(0.32) 
Financial Services Companies dummy  -22.12  
(-1.20) 
-21.14 
 (-1.14) 
-22.78  
(-1.27) 
Manufacturing Companies dummy  - - - 
 
Other Services Companies dummy  18.56  
(0.94) 
16.06  
(0.82) 
12.35 
(0.64) 
Regime 1   -293.30 
(-3.21)** 
-270.22  
(-3.02)** 
Regime 2   -290.85  
(-3.16)** 
-266.66  
(-2.96)** 
Regime 3   - - 
Promoters’ contribution    -2.33  
(-1.63) 
 
Public investors’ contribution 
   -2.72  
(-1.93)* 
 
Institutional investors’ contribution 
  
 
 -3.42  
(-2.38)** 
Other investors’ contribution - - - - 
N 1914 1913 1913 1905 
Adj R2 0.0216 0.0260 0.0275 0.0360 
Deleted: levels of 
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Table 5 Ordered Probit Model Results 
 
This table is based on data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), made in India during 1990-04. The table reports 
IPO post-performance results. We use an ordered probit model to measure the likelihood of success (failure) for a 
given IPO after listing on the stock exchange. The proxy for success (failure) is the current (as of Dec 2004) listing 
category on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).  The BSE classifies all listed firms into different quality bands. 
There are four main quality-based bands, namely, A, B1, B2, and Z on the BSE. The A band represents the best 
quality stocks in terms of size, liquidity and financial performance and the rest follow in hierarchical sequence, with 
the Z band representing firms that have violated BSE listing norms or have been declared bankrupt. In the ordered 
probit model, firms takes the values 1 through 4, if the firms’ current listing bands are A, B1, B2 and Z respectively.  
We also use all the control variables that are used in Table 4. The ordered probit model (Model 4) is represented as 
follows:  
 
Prob(Failure) = c + b1(Size of firm at the time of IPO)+ b2 (Private Indian Group Dummy) + b3 (Standalone 
companies dummy) + b4 (Government companies dummy) + b5 (Private Foreign Group dummy) +  b6 (Banking 
companies dummy) + b7 (Financial services companies dummy ) + b8 (Manufacturing companies dummy) + b9 
(Other services dummy) + b10 (Regime 1) + b11 (Regime 2) + b12(Regime 3 dummy) + b13 (Promoters’ 
contribution) + b14 (Public investors’ contribution)+ b15 (Institutional investors’ contribution) + b16 (Other 
investors’ contribution) + b17 (Extent of underpricing) + e.   
 
Note that models 1, 2 and 3 are variations of model 4, with or without sector dummies, regime dummies, 
subscription details and subscription details, respectively.  Model 5 includes all variables that are presented in the 
table. Note: z-values are in parentheses. The *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. The z-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
C - - - - 
Asset Size (at  the time of IPO) -0.000 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.000 
(-1.28) 
-0.000 
(-0.42) 
-.0000  
(-0.55) 
Private Indian Group dummy -0.619 
(-9.36)*** 
-0.642 
(-9.65)*** 
-0.672 
(-10.01)*** 
-0.647  
(-9.55)*** 
Standalone companies dummy - - - - 
Government companies dummy -1.38 
(-4.73)*** 
-1.04 
(-3.46)** 
-1.008 
(-3.36)** 
-0.974 
(-3.24)** 
Private Foreign Group dummy -0.899 
(-4.73)*** 
-0.928 
(-4.89)*** 
-0.902 
(-4.73)*** 
-0.898  
(-4.68)*** 
Banking companies dummy - -1.823 
(-6.43)*** 
-1.801 
(-6.34)*** 
-1.749 
(-6.10)*** 
Financial Services companies dummy - 0.095 
(1.30) 
0.094 
(1.28) 
0.104  
(1.40) 
Manufacturing companies dummy - - 
 
- 
 
-  
 
Other Services companies dummy - - - - 
Regime 1 - - 0.306 
(4.48)*** 
0.796 
(2.18)* 
Regime 2 - - -0.715 
(-1.96)* 
-0.507 
(-1.38) 
Regime 3 - - - - 
Promoters’ contribution - - - 0.007  
(1.09) 
Public investors’ contribution - - - 0.009 
(1.42) 
Institutional investors’ contribution - - - 0.001  
(0.17) 
Other investors’ contribution - - - - 
Extent of underpricing -0.003 
(-3.57)** 
-0.003 
(-3.58)** 
-0.0002 
(-3.36)** 
-0.0003  
(-3.13)** 
N 1884 1884 1884 1876 
Log Likelihood -1779.47 -1750.85 -1731.43 -1708.001 
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Table 6 IPO Long-Run Performance Results 
 
This table is based on data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), made in India during 1990-04. The table shows 
the average cumulative abnormal returns of firms (CAAR) on the BSE 100 index, and the average buy and hold 
returns of firms (BHAR) on BSE 100. The t-values are reported in parentheses. CAAR and BHAR are calculated 
and reported for different periods, for 12, 24 and 36 months respectively. The number of observations (N) varies 
based on the time period used to calculate CAAR and BHAR. CAAR is defined as 1/n CARi, where CARi = Σt= 1 to T 
(Rit –Rmt); T = 12 or 24 or 36 months. BHAR is defined as 1/n BHERi, where BHERi = Πt=1 to T (1+Rit) – Π (1+Rmt). 
T = 12 or 24 or 36 months. Rit = return of firm i and Rmt is the market bench mark return (BSE 100 index return). 
The *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The t-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
Ownership Type N  
(12 M) 
N  
(24 M) 
N  
(36 M) 
CAAR 
(12 M) 
BHAR 
(12 M) 
CAAR 
(24 M) 
BHAR 
(24 M) 
CAAR (36 
M)  
BHAR  
(36 M) 
Private Indian 
Groups 
92 83 79 -0.265 
(3.61)** 
-0.614  
(-4.34)*** 
-0.465 
 (-4.84)*** 
-0.792  
(-6.40)*** 
-0.606 
 (-4.76)*** 
-0.820  
(-5.43)*** 
Stand-alone 
Companies 
426 401 391 -0.065 
 (-1.46) 
-0.307  
(-1.42) 
-0.201 
 (-3.67)** 
-0.792 
 (-6.40)*** 
-0.321  
(-4.77)*** 
-0.820  
(-5.44)*** 
Private Foreign 
Groups 
12 9 9 -0.609  
(-2.94)** 
-0.943 
 (-7.20)*** 
-1.015  
(-2.91)** 
-1.001 
 (-6.60)*** 
-0.995 
 (-2.44)* 
-1.012  
(-6.18)*** 
Government 
Companies 
13 9 6 0.082 
(0.81) 
-0.106  
(-0.27) 
0.191  
(1.80) 
0.219 
(0.11) 
0.094 
 (0.33) 
0.181  
(0.04) 
All companies 543 502 485 -0.105 
 (-2.79)* 
-0.366  
(-2.48)* 
-0.250 
(-5.27)*** 
-0.448 
 (-3.23)** 
-0.373 
 (-6.39)** 
-0.501 
(-2.77)* 
 
Deleted: *indicates values are 
significant at the 1% level. 
Deleted: levels of 
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Table 7 One-Way ANOVA Multiple Mean Comparison Test for Testing the Significant Difference Between Long Run 
Performance of Different Groups. 
 
This table is based on data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), made in India during 1990-04, on a yearly basis. The data are classified into four groups, based on the nature of the 
ownership of the firm making the IPO, namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-alone Companies, Government Companies and Private Foreign Groups. AAR is defined as 1/n Σt = 1 to T 
(Rit –Rmt) for stock i, where Rit = return of firm i and Rmt is the market bench mark return (BSE 100 index return) and T = 12 or 24 or 36 months.  The statistical 
significance of the differences between groups is based on the Tukey multiple comparison test. This test allows a comparison of the means simultaneously for multiple samples. For 
instance, in the case of the initial return variable, the Private Indian Group sample mean is compared with the other three groups. The Stand-alone Companies sample is also compared 
in the same manner, but, leaving out the Private Indian Group sample, which was compared in the first set, etc. The * represents statistical significance at the 1% level. The p-
values are in parentheses. 
 
Variable 
(i) 
Private 
Indian 
Groups 
Stand-
alone 
Companies 
Government 
Companies 
Private 
Foreign 
Groups 
Variable 
(i) 
 
Private 
Indian 
Groups 
Stand-alone 
Companies 
Government 
Companies 
Private 
Foreign 
Groups 
AAR 
(12 MONTHS) 
    AAR  
(24 MONTHS) 
    
Private Indian 
Groups 
- 0.0091 
(0.972) 
0.0283  
(0.531) 
 
0.022 
(0.719) 
Private Indian 
Groups 
- 0.0271 
(0.536) 
0.0361 
(0.279) 
0.0114 
(0.943) 
Stand-alone 
Companies 
 - -0.192 
(0.796) 
0.311 
(0.446) 
Stand-alone 
Companies 
 - 0.009 
(0.970) 
0.385 
(0.227) 
Government 
Companies 
  - 0.0504 
(0.078) 
Government 
Companies 
  - 0.0475 
(0.088) 
Private 
Foreign 
Groups 
   - Private 
Foreign 
Groups 
   - 
AAR 
 (36 months) 
         
Private Indian 
Groups 
- 0.005 
(0.993) 
0.025 
(0.557) 
0.0218 
(0.666) 
     
Stand-alone 
Companies 
 - 0.0199 
(0.725) 
0.0269 
(0.495) 
     
Government 
Companies 
  - 0.0468 
(0.070) 
     
Private 
Foreign 
Groups 
   -      
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